



Confinement and Dependency:

The Decline of Refugee Rights in Tanzania

by Gregory Chen, Director of Policy Analysis and Research

[Refugees] must as quickly as possible be given a means of producing or earning their own livelihood... Investment to meet their needs will never be wasted in the growing African economies even if these refugees should all in the future return to the place from whence they came.¹

—Julius Nyerere, Former President of Tanzania, 1979

Tanzania has hosted refugees for almost five decades now. We have often paid dearly for that humanitarian gesture, in terms of security, in terms of economic and social development, and in terms of strained relations with neighbors.²

—Benjamin Mkapa, President of Tanzania, 2002

In the past decade, Tanzania has dramatically changed its refugee policy from a welcoming approach toward a highly rights-restrictive one that confines refugees to camps. For the first three decades following independence in 1961, Tanzania was well-regarded for granting refugees the use of land, the right to work, freedom of movement, and freedom to live among local populations. But, beginning in the 1990s, the Government imposed restrictions on refugees' basic rights in violation of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention), to which Tanzania is a party. In recent years, the Government has *refouled* refugees—forcing back at least one hundred Burundians in late 2004 and early 2005—and denied them access to markets commonly shared with nationals. Tanzania discourages integration of refugees among the local population and promotes repatriation aggressively,

sometimes compromising returnee safety. Not only do those in camps experience hardship, but urban refugees in Dar es Salaam, a small and often overlooked population, find it extremely difficult to find jobs, start businesses, and avoid harassment and discrimination.

The Government cites three reasons for its hardened policy toward refugees. First, it perceives that Tanzania has borne an unfairly large burden, hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees during the past decade and currently over 600,000, more than any other African nation.

Second, officials commonly allege that refugees hurt the country's economy, environment, and infrastructure, burden its social services, and increase crime and insecurity. Officials and media sources, however, rarely question whether the Government's policy of confining the entire refugee population in 13 camps might contribute to the alleged harms. Independent research shows that refugees' presence has brought benefits and that some Tanzanians have positive attitudes about their presence.³

Third, donor nations, including the United States and the European Union, have not funded development projects that improve the economy of refugee-hosting communities or foster trade and labor exchange between refugees and nationals (see charts, p. 41). Instead, donors continue to favor traditional "care and maintenance" programs that keep refugees dependent on aid. This trend has lent support to the Government's position that it should confine refugees to camps rather than allow them to work.

Donors could reverse this trend by making a standing commitment to provide additional assistance conditioned upon the Government granting refugees' rights and improving protection. The funding would be premised on

Photo: Burundian refugees at Lukole B camp.
Photo credit: USCRI/G. Chen

the Government demonstrating a clear commitment to ending *refoulement* and arbitrary detention of refugees and granting them freedom of movement and the right to work. Such support would encourage the Government to find solutions that will not only grant refugees their rights but also benefit Tanzania.

Camp Confinement and Aid-Dependency

At the end of 2004, over 245,000 refugees from Burundi and 154,000 from the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo-Kinshasa) lived in 13 camps along Tanzania's western border. Some of these camps, ranging in size from 6,000 to more than 90,000 refugees, have been there for over a decade. Another 200,000 Burundians, who mostly arrived in the 1970s, lived in settlements outside the camps. Since 2002, about 160,000 Burundians have repatriated, and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated 85,000 would return in 2005.⁴ The Government announced in 2005 that the Congolese should begin repatriation soon despite lingering instability in Congo-Kinshasa.⁵ Even under optimistic forecasts for repatriation, however, hundreds of thousands of refugees will remain in Tanzania for several years.

Constituting one of the largest "warehoused"⁶ populations in the world, these camp-based refugees may not reside outside of the camps or sustain themselves economically.⁷ The restriction on movement makes it extremely difficult for them to trade, farm, and work, reducing them to almost complete dependence on food and aid from UN and other international agencies. Within some camps, the Government has even forbidden refugees from farming land made available when other refugees have repatriated leaving a vacant plot.⁸ By preventing them from earning income, the Government has jeopardized their food security, according to a July 2004 World Food Programme (WFP) study.⁹ In comparison, the Government allowed the 200,000 Burundians living outside the camps to work but restricted their movement outside the settlement.

In several camps, nongovern-

mental organizations (NGOs) run income-generating projects to develop skills in carpentry, bread-making, weaving, bicycle repair, and wood-carving. These projects provide important skills but limited income under Tanzania's policy. The restrictions on movement prevent refugees from purchasing raw materials or selling their products, or create such barriers to entry in the market as to render the activities economically unsustainable. At Lukole A camp, women refugees have trained to weave intricately patterned baskets from dried grass and colored strips of recycled plastic. The prices range from \$2 to \$4 for items that women spend two to three days weaving by hand. Lacking real demand for their tourist-oriented goods in the camp or any means to market them beyond the camp, the women are



A Burundian boy in Lukole A camp, home to about 50,000 refugees. The boy standing behind him sells bread hanging from the plastic bag. Throughout 2004, Tanzanian authorities forbade Lukole A refugees from trading in the camp market, leaving them few alternatives to earn money.

Photo: USCRI/G. Chen



lucky if they sell one item each month.

In the same camp, men gather at the carpentry project, proudly displaying their work: shelves, tables, and bed-frames. Like the women, however, most are able to sell goods only once every several weeks. The Government's policy forbids them from traveling to Ngara to sell at market rates. These complaints were echoed several hundred miles south at Lugufu I camp, where Congolese carpenters noted that raw wood was 15 to 30 percent more expensive to buy in the camp. Additionally, there were far fewer buy-

“ [R]ESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT AND THE CLOSURE OF MARKETS ... LED TO A DETERIORATING FOOD SECURITY SITUATION AMONG [REFUGEE] HOUSEHOLDS.”

—World Food Programme

ers in the camp than in the city of Kigoma, where refugees are forbidden to live, work, or travel.

Despite the Government's ban on travel, refugees still exit and enter the camps risking arrest and detention. Refugees found beyond a four-kilometer radius of the camps in search of work, trade opportunities, or simply to gather firewood are subject to arrest and imprisonment. In 2004, the Government prosecuted refugees found in Kigoma, in some cases imposing prison sentences of up to two years.¹⁰ In June 2002, nearly two-thirds of the 79 refugees convicted in Kasulu District had been prosecuted for administrative offenses, primarily for violating restrictions on their freedom of movement.¹¹

Market Closures Lead to Food Insecurity

Prohibited from leaving the camps and therefore from engaging in economic activity in Ngara, Kibondo, Kigoma, Dar es Salaam, and other towns, refugees are highly dependent on markets in or near the camps that are sometimes open to trade with nationals. In the past two years, however, market shutdowns and the enforcement of movement restrictions by local authorities have all but closed off this option for many refugees in the Kibondo and Ngara regions. In fall 2003, local authorities permanently closed down the large and thriving Lukole A camp market which served more than 50,000 Burundian refugees. In the camps in the Kibondo region, local authorities prohibited refu-

gees from leaving camps to access recently built common markets donors intended to encourage trade between nationals and refugees.


The markets are vital to ensuring the food security, survival, and protection of refugees.¹² Refugees rely on the markets for all manner of trade, including that in essential items such as food, household supplies, blankets, and clothing. They also need markets to sell food rations to obtain essential non-food items. In Tanzania, refugees commonly sell up to 15 percent of their rations. The 2003 closure of the Lukole A market, now an empty space covering several acres, left refugee carpenters, shoemakers, clothing vendors, produce and bread sellers, and many others with no other venue for the sale of their products.

The 2004 WFP study concluded “that restrictions on movement and the closure of markets ... led to a deteriorating food security situation among households.”¹³ Based on a random survey of nearly 800 refugee households in 12 camps, the study found that the restrictions “led to an increase in the frequency and severity” of detrimental coping strategies, such as reducing meals, borrowing, selling household assets, migrating elsewhere, or repatriating.¹⁴ While reducing meals or borrowing were the most common strategies, 12 percent of those surveyed reported that household members were forced to migrate elsewhere or repatriate and 8 percent resorted to prostitution or theft to survive. The Congolese refugees, of whom 61 percent had market access, were less food insecure than Burundians in camps where market closures were more dramatic and 77 percent had little or no market access.

The findings of the WFP study show the link between refugees' food insecurity and their right to economic and wage-earning activities as guaranteed under the 1951 Convention. The study urged that the Government reopen markets or identify “alternative income sources.”¹⁵ While the report did not examine the market closures' impact on Tanzanian nationals, it noted that “it is likely that local traders have also suffered from these closures.”¹⁶ By halting the operation of the center of economic activity, not only in camps but in the surrounding area, the Government also impeded economic development in a region desperately in need of it.

The Government justified the closure of the Lukole A market as a response to a string of armed attacks and robberies in the Ngara region. In 2004, attacks continued to be a serious problem. Armed bandits robbed refugees, NGO staff, and nationals on roads and in towns near the Lukole A and B refugee camps, and in May, killed an NGO staff member while he and others were traveling on the road. UNHCR has for many years paid for a security detail of over 200 Tanzanian officers costing about \$1.5 million annually.¹⁷ The University of Dar es Salaam conducted a study in 2003 and recommended that donors commit additional funds for security. The Government did not reopen markets, however, even when security improved.

A Woman Weaver Trapped in the Camps



but garner little interest in the local markets where refugees and Tanzanians primarily trade food and essentials. The Government has not allowed the women to market their goods in larger towns frequented by foreigners. Camp visitors are their sole customer base. In one month, \$36 was the group's total income—and that was a good month. In the month before it was only \$10, and some women sold nothing in half a year. A woman might spend two weeks on a large platter that sells for \$6. Finding a customer "is like waiting for a grown up boy to come marry me; he may never come," Claudette says, drawing knowing laughter from the group.

Even by local standards, weaving pays poorly. Most women could make much more working for local villagers farming or doing piecemeal labor, but the Government has banned refugees from traveling more than 4 kilometers from the camp. Two years ago, the local "sungu sungu" police caught Claudette returning from a village. "They forced me to pay 20,000 shillings," she said, referring to the illegal bribe they extorted, equal to almost \$20. "They would have beaten me. I was out of the 4 kilometer area and there was

Ten years ago, Claudette arrived in Tanzania fleeing ethnic cleansing and bloodshed in Burundi only to find herself confined to a refugee camp with few options to support her six children. Her husband left her in 1998, supposedly to find work and earn money, but he never came back. Now the part of the women's weaving operation in Lukole A camp which houses 50,000 refugees, she and 26 other women make intricately patterned baskets, place mats, and serving platters from grass and strips of recycled colored plastic.

Their products may be appealing to a tourist's eye,

no point in reporting" the extortion.

Crime and banditry, she says, have also gone up. "People must find alternatives to survive." Weaving is "not a good job, but it's safer to stay in the camp." The camp containment policy has kept her and so many others dependent on World Food Programme (WFP) food rations, which dropped at times by 20 to 40 percent in 2004 due to funding shortages. A decade has passed and Claudette's life is standing still. She is not looking for a man to marry her but for a job so she can provide for her family: both seem unlikely in the refugee camp.

Photo Credit: USCRI/G. Chen



Therefore, it is unclear that increased funding would result in a change of government policy unless the funding was contingent upon reopening the markets.

The Government did not demonstrate why closing the market was a necessary or rational response to the robberies which also occurred in other areas such as local towns and on roads. Ironically, the market closures may have led to higher crime rates in hosting areas. The WFP study found that food insecurity compelled some refugees to steal, which generally had a greater impact on nearby villages.¹⁸ As Beth Whitaker observed in 1999, the “government approach of discouraging refugee agriculture exposed some local communities more than others to the risks of crop theft and banditry.”¹⁹

Without means of trade or earning income, refugees require greater care and maintenance assistance to survive. Several years ago, WFP had planned decreases in rations because of expectations that refugees could farm small plots, work, and become fully food-secure within two years.²⁰ Due to the severe restrictions on refugees’ ability to farm and work, however, the 2003 UN Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) in Tanzania concluded that the refugees would be more dependent on rations, thereby raising assistance costs.²¹ The JAM recommended but did not obtain an increase in food rations from 1,857 kilocalories per day to the international SPHERE standard of 2,100 kilocalories.²² In fact, despite the increased need for food, budget and resource shortfalls forced WFP to decrease rations to as low as 60 to 80 percent of what refugees had been receiving.²³

Refugees in Dar es Salaam – An Urban Underclass

Tanzania’s restrictions on freedom of movement and other rights have had severe consequences not only on camp residents but also on those who have migrated illegally to urban regions. The several thousand refugees in urban areas are small in number when compared to those in camps, but they are important because the Government and UNHCR offer them almost no assistance or protection. Nor does UNHCR maintain accurate statistics on urban refugees. The Refugee Self-reliance Initiative (RSI), a self-governed association of refugees in Dar es Salaam, has counted almost 2,000 refugees primarily of Congolese, Rwandan, and Burundian origin. RSI believes there are at least an additional 1,000 refugees in Dar es Salaam who have not been counted, totaling at least 3,000 urban refugees altogether.

While food insecurity forced some refugees to leave the camps or repatriate,²⁴ many more leave the camps be-



Boundaries, names, and designations on this map do not imply official UN endorsement or acceptance.
Sources: UNHCR, Global Insight digital mapping - © 1998 Europa Technologies Ltd.

cause they have never lived in a rural area or farmed before leaving their home country. Camp life is a particular hardship for this urbanite subgroup.

Among one group of 13 RSI members USCRI interviewed, only one described himself as a farmer and only two others had lived in rural areas. The rest were city dwellers: taxi drivers, teachers, tailors, engineers, a priest, a postal officer, and an NGO logistician. Most came from Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Kisangani, or Gitarama in the late 1990s.²⁵ These numbers, which reveal that urban refugees generally hail from urban backgrounds in their home country, are consistent with Roos Willems’ 2001-2002 survey of 300 refugees from the three major groups in Dar es Salaam. In that survey, nine in ten Congolese respondents had lived in the three major urban areas in eastern Congo; 39 percent of the Burundian respondents had resided in Bujumbura; and 34 percent of Rwandan respondents came from Kigali.²⁶

Of the RSI members USCRI interviewed, nearly all tried living in Tanzania's camps but found survival too difficult. The leader of the RSI association, Thierry-Noel Mageni, spoke passionately about his reasons for leaving the camps: "They say they give us rations, but we could not survive on such rations ... Our freedom was denied. We were kept like cattle, like cows on a farm. We were denied the right to work or to show what we were capable of." Another member, who held a high-level position in the Rwandan postal agency, said living in the camp "would have been very painful for my family. I would not know how to farm or survive." To support himself, his wife, and five children, he teaches French to Tanzanians and foreigners—illegal activity for which he could be arrested.

The lack of rural survival skills among the RSI group was comparable to that in Michela Machiavello's 2003 study of urban refugees in Kampala, Uganda, which found that 62 percent of the refugees interviewed could not farm at all or not well enough to survive.²⁷ Life in the camps, Machiavello reported, was "dull, boring, depressing and passive," with "very limited possibilities of improving [one's] quality of life."²⁸ Willems' survey population reported having experienced or heard about intolerable conditions in the camps, including insufficient rations, widespread illness, and a lack of work. Many were also afraid that refugees in the camps would target them for their ethnic or political affiliations. In Willems' sample, the urban refugees were considerably more educated than those in the camps. Before coming to Dar es Salaam, 36 percent were students, 18 percent engaged in trade, 16 percent had paid employment, and 12 percent were self-employed.²⁹

UNHCR's global urban refugee policy states that the agency "should promote the refugees' right to work and access to national services, wherever possible."³⁰ With respect to Tanzania, for several years UNHCR has listed the protection and assistance of urban refugees as one of its principal objectives.³¹ The agency has been unable to achieve this, however, and has acquiesced to Tanzania's policy of punishing refugees who leave the camps. UNHCR and its implementing NGO partners provide almost no education, food, health care, or other services to urban refugees. Worse, UNHCR does not provide legal protection by issuing registration or identification papers, often cited by refugees as more important than aid.³² As a result, urban refugees survive as an underclass on the fringes of Tanzanian society.

Under Tanzania's 1998 Refugees Act, refugees who do not live in a refugee camp or possess a permit allowing them to live outside the camps are illegal immigrants, subject to arrest and criminal prosecution. Daily, they fear arrest, detention, and harassment. Their illegal status makes it difficult or impossible for them to obtain work, apply for



Top: A refugee-run tailoring shop in Dar es Salaam trains mostly Congolese, Burundians, and Rwandans.

Above: Women and children at the water station in Lugufu camp, host to more than 93,000 Congolese refugees. In 2004, fighting in eastern Congo-Kinshasa drove several hundred to flee to Tanzania. Photos: USCRI/G. Chen

loans, start businesses, or rent residential or office space. Denied their rights or assistance, urban refugees are among those who suffer the most from refugee warehousing.

The refugees' lack of legal status is a major obstacle to their economic self-sufficiency. RSI has attempted to launch small businesses including a sewing and tailoring shop and a chicken-raising operation, but the organization was unable to obtain credit or funding. As a result, RSI



could rent only four sewing machines and a small streetfront shop of under 1,000 square feet. The limited space and machines prevent the women who run the operation from working at capacity. The RSI tailoring mart appears to be well-positioned in a bustling part of the capital, but the refugees are concerned that if they expand operations it will attract attention and the authorities will shut it down.

RSI has also tried to organize an education pro-

“THEY SAY THEY GIVE US RATIONS, BUT WE COULD NOT SURVIVE ON SUCH RATIONS ... WE WERE KEPT LIKE CATTLE, LIKE COWS ON A FARM. WE WERE DENIED THE RIGHT TO WORK OR TO SHOW WHAT WE WERE CAPABLE OF.”

gram for about 400 refugee children who cannot attend public schools. However, the group can neither seek funds from UNHCR nor register as an NGO or non-profit organization with the Government, which precludes RSI from obtaining funds from many foundations or government sources. Other NGOs are hesitant to provide monitoring or technical assistance out of concern that a direct relationship would risk the Government shutting down their own operations.

Due to their lack of legal status, urban refugees cannot rely upon law enforcement to protect them. Several Congolese refugees who taught French to Tanzanians and foreign visitors were later denied payment by their students. One man said 10 of his 14 students still owed him fees for up to six months of lessons. He was afraid that if he complained to the police or local government officials, they would arrest him and possibly send him to the camps or deport him.

New Approaches Needed to Strengthen Refugee Rights in Tanzania

Tanzania's harsh treatment of urban refugees, its deportation of asylum seekers and refugees, the market closures, and other rights-restrictive practices constitute the continued erosion of what was once the model of refugee protection in Africa. Tanzania's policy shift in the last decade is not an isolated phenomenon. Other countries such as Kenya have also weakened refugee protections and deprived refugees of basic rights in recent years.³³ Even while Tanza-

nia violates these core principles of refugee protection, UNHCR and the U.S. Government have failed to hold its Government accountable to the 1951 Convention and other international law. For example, in fall 2004, UNHCR protested to the Government several incidents in which local authorities *refouled* or deported up to 800 Burundian refugees and asylum seekers, but kept the dispute out of the press for several months until January 2005. The U.S. Government also protested the *refoulement* but similarly held back from publicly reproaching Tanzania. Severe human rights violations require a much more forceful international response.³⁴

Calls for accountability, however, are more effective when accompanied by a clear commitment to support Tanzania's refugee hosting responsibility. Tanzania has justified its more restrictive policy as necessary to address the perceived negative impact of refugees and the lack of adequate support from donors. While sometimes exaggerated, Tanzania's concerns cannot be disregarded. Donors should confront these issues while at the same time holding Tanzania accountable to international standards of refugee protection.

Challenging Claims about Refugee Impact on Tanzania

For years, Tanzanian officials have taken the position that refugees impede economic development, harm the environment and infrastructure, and drain limited government resources. Anti-refugee sentiment overwhelmingly dominates the public discourse with little recognition of the possible benefits their presence brings. In December 2004, the governing party newspaper, *Uhuru*, announced:

*We are tired of refugees.... Tanzania has hosted close to 500,000 refugees whose stay has not benefited Tanzania in any way. Instead the country has seen its environment destroyed and incurred heavy expenses to maintain the refugees. At the moment the country's western region ... has suffered massive environmental degradation and deteriorating security due to rising criminal activities since some of the refugees have been entering the country armed.*³⁵

“We have often paid dearly” for hosting refugees, announced President Mkapa in 2002, blaming them for security, economic and social development problems, and strained foreign relations.³⁶ In recent years, district commissioners and foreign affairs ministers have accused refugees of terrorizing locals, engaging in banditry, and causing increased crime rates.³⁷ A 2003 review of news stories and government statements about refugees found repeated accounts of the negative impact of refugees but few if any positive accounts.³⁸

Over time the highly unfavorable media coverage

Confinement and Dependency


has fostered resentment against refugees and undermined refugee protection. However, the Government and media never seem to consider the costs of keeping refugees permanently aid-dependent and confined to camps. Rarely, if ever, do officials consider whether it is the policy of camp containment that harms the environment and hinders local development rather than the refugees. Nor do they generally ask whether granting refugees the freedom to engage in work activities would improve economic development.

Furthermore, the complaints about refugees are frequently inaccurate. Two studies found that refugees' presence has had varied impacts on Tanzania, including costs and benefits. In 2003, the Center for the Study of Forced Migration at the University of Dar es Salaam (CSFM) examined the impact of refugees on multiple sectors of the western region, including its healthcare system, economy, education system, environment, government services, infrastructure, crime, and security. Beth Whitaker's 1999 study concluded that host communities were affected differently by refugees' presence, depending on the hosts' socio-economic

status, gender, geographic location, and other factors. Both CSFM and Whitaker found that refugees' presence put a major strain on local government services, infrastructure, and the western region's environment, as well as creating competition for natural resources.³⁹

At the same time, the studies pointed out that UN agencies and NGOs have improved roads, bridges, and airports, making a significant contribution to the region though not always in places where local Tanzanians would have wanted. UNHCR, WFP, and NGO projects have also significantly improved the region's healthcare and education. Furthermore, illegal refugee labor on local farms increased agricultural production. The 2004 UNHCR/WFP Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) concluded:

During mission discussions with local community members it became clear that local communities benefit greatly from (illegal) cheap refugee labour resulting in increased agricultural production within the areas surrounding the camps. In fact, sale of labor for cultivation/farming in gen-



At a Tanzanian village near Lugufu camp, residents, teachers, and a local official (with book) said refugees brought more trade, better healthcare, and more local transport to town and feared loss of services if the refugees return to Congo-Kinshasa. Photo: USCRI/G. Chen



eral, although informal/illegal, is so clearly beneficial to both refugees and locals that the impact once the refugees depart will likely be felt deeply within the local community on incomes, and overall agricultural production.⁴⁰

These improvements would not have occurred without the presence of refugees and the aid agencies. Legalizing the refugees' movement and livelihoods would increase the benefits.

Both studies found major environmental impacts, specifically high levels of deforestation in camp regions, but the damage would have been much less if Tanzania had not warehoused the refugees in 13 camps along the western border, compelling them to draw upon a small area for firewood.⁴¹ Whitaker observed: "The establishment of several large and concentrated refugee camps increased the severity of environmental damage."⁴² The CSFM study reported that some western provinces had more crime, but the rise in crime was due to more people living in the region, not to refugees having a greater propensity to commit crime.⁴³ Regional crime and prison statistics showed that refugees were no more likely to commit crimes than Tanzanians. The CSFM study also attributed the crime and security problems to the region's proximity to conflict-ridden areas where arms were more available, rather than to refugee criminal activity.

Refugee trade and economic activity provided significant economic benefits to Tanzania, a fact that government officials frequently overlooked. Until it was forced to close, the Lukole A camp market was the largest open market in Ngara District and the second largest in the region, where the refugee population constituted a major business opportunity.⁴⁴ The Government closed it down to the detriment not only of refugees but to Tanzanian nationals and trade in the region. In this regard, the Government's refusal to recognize the economic benefits of refugees' presence hurt local host economies. NGOs and UN workers were highly skeptical of the Government's security rationale for closing the market, particularly since robberies occurred in towns where markets still remained open and because the Government never reopened the market after security improved. They viewed the closure as a strategy to make life more difficult for the refugees in order to compel their repatriation.

Tanzanians themselves may not share the negative views expressed in the press and media. In 2004, USCRI interviewed eight Tanzanians at a village ten kilometers from Lugufu I camp in the Kigoma region, asking how host villagers perceived their quality of life. The interviewer did not ask about refugees unless the respondent first mentioned them. All said that their quality of life had improved in the past three to five years. A woman whose family farmed said that markets were easier to reach and that road quality and transportation had improved to previously inaccessible towns nearby. She perceived the improved mar-

ket access as the result of the refugee camp market where Tanzanians could sell their produce and buy more goods than had been available locally. A village schoolteacher said that health services had greatly increased. The locals received services from the refugee camp health clinic equipped with a lab for testing malaria, HIV/AIDS, and other diseases.⁴⁵

When asked if they had concerns about the future, one man said he had heard that the refugees might be repatriating soon. He asked what would happen to the health clinic. Hearing his comment, a few others asked whether the markets would stay open and wondered aloud if the bus service would decrease. The respondents uniformly saw improvements in their quality of life and attributed it to the refugees' and aid agencies' presence and feared most the loss of services and trade opportunities after repatriation. While these views only came from the residents of one village, their comments echo the conclusion of the 2004 UN Consolidated Appeal Process which referred to full repatriation as "the worst-case scenario for the [nearby villages] in terms of access to services utilised in the camps for local populations who have no other facilities to turn to."⁴⁶ Nevertheless, the Government continues to push relentlessly for Burundians to return even at the risk of harming host communities.

In 2004, in a follow-up to its research study, CSFM held workshops in the camp regions with Tanzanian officials, UN agencies, and their implementing partners. According to Bonaventure Rutinwa, the study's chief author, these discussions generated an uncommonly open and balanced dialogue about refugees.⁴⁷ UN agencies have made efforts to reduce the perception that refugees receive better treatment than nationals by including the local population in humanitarian planning.⁴⁸ With national elections approaching in October 2005, a public education campaign about refugees could correct inaccurate perceptions and counter the scapegoating of refugees. Increasing public awareness that refugees bring benefits to host communities might convince some Tanzanian government officials that granting refugees rights would enable them to contribute more to the economy.⁴⁹


Development Assistance and Refugee Rights

However imbalanced the Tanzanian Government's representations of refugees may be, refugee protection is an international responsibility and donors and humanitarian actors should seek to mitigate any negative impact refugees have on host countries, as UNHCR and other UN agencies have attempted.⁵⁰ The Government and aid agencies should view refugees as potential engines of economic development, rather than burdens. Projects such as shared markets increase trade and labor exchange between refugees and Tanzanians and offer benefits to the host country.⁵¹ To make these projects more successful, however, the




UN FUNDED PROJECTS IN TANZANIA

\$3,765,029



UNDERFUNDED UN APPEALS FOR REFUGEE HOSTING AREAS



Government must grant refugees freedom of movement and the rights to work and trade.

In Tanzania, past efforts to link refugee relief efforts with development assistance yielded limited success because host and donor nations differed in their basic objectives, resulting eventually in a loss of donor commitment.⁵² Since the 1981 International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA I), many African host nations have expected donor nations to provide assistance to mitigate the alleged burden of refugees on their coun-

In 2004, UN agencies requested \$4.7 million for additional projects to aid refugee hosting areas. (Bar chart) Donors contributed \$865,000, less than a fifth of the needed funds. Donors spent 5 percent of all refugee aid on refugee hosting areas, and 95 percent on care and maintenance. (Pie chart)

Source: UN, Tanzania 2004 Consolidated Appeals Process
 Photo: Ration day at Lukole A camp. Funding and pipeline breaks in late 2004 forced the World Food Programme to decrease rations to about 1,300 kilocalories—international standards call for 2,100 kilocalories.

Photo credit: USCRI/G. Chen



tries' economic development in addition to the support donors were providing for relief operations.⁵³ African nations wanted refugees eventually to return home or resettle in third countries.⁵⁴ By contrast donors wanted their contributions to lead to permanent local integration and to benefit refugees directly rather than be used for large development projects.

The lack of agreement on basic objectives has continued to undermine donors' willingness to maintain funding for development-oriented projects.⁵⁵ During the mid-

“LINKING RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT, IN THE RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT OF THE CAMP WITH PROFOUND LIMITATIONS ON SELF-RELIANCE ACTIVITIES FOR REFUGEES AND THE AID ORGANIZATIONS, IS NOT FEASIBLE ... REFUGEES AS WELL AS ORGANIZATIONS MAY END UP BECOMING TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON THE ROUTINE ACTIONS OF HANDING OUT AND RECEIVING FOOD.”

—European Community
Humanitarian Office (ECHO)

1990s, when Tanzania received a mass influx of refugees from Burundi and Rwanda, it received pledges for more than \$40 million to be spent over several years to address the refugees' impact on host communities.⁵⁶ From 1995-2004, UNHCR spent a total of \$21.3 million to improve roads and other transport infrastructure, schools, hospitals, dispensaries, water systems, electrical systems, community centers, and teacher resource centers, including about \$3.5 million to hire security guards in the western region.⁵⁷ These projects, however, were as much a response to the Tanzanian Government's calls for support for the emergency refugee influx as they were a commitment to long-term development.⁵⁸ As the Rwandans and Burundians began to return in the late 1990s, funding for these development projects slowed even as large numbers of refugees remained. From 1998-2002, lack of donor interest prevented UNHCR from completing programs intended to aid refugee hosting areas, such as improving roads, bridges and other infrastructure.⁵⁹

Humanitarian aid to western Tanzania in 2004

continued to favor short-term emergency relief over long-term development projects that would benefit the entire region. As part of their Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) for Tanzania, UN agencies proposed several development projects for refugee hosting areas. UNHCR spent \$2.9 million of its \$28 million budget on security, schools, medical facilities, and roads for hosting areas. But commitments for other agencies' requests for development assistance fell far short. The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and World Health Organization (WHO) appealed for \$1.7 million for assistance to Tanzanian communities affected by refugees but received only \$160,000. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) sought \$1.2 million to develop rural markets and the economy and to address the environmental impact of refugees, but only \$125,000 of the request was met. Other requests from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and UNDP to collect weapons from border regions or assist agricultural development in hosting areas were poorly funded or not funded at all.⁶⁰ In total, these agencies sought nearly \$4.7 million to aid hosting regions, but received only \$865,000.⁶¹

The 2004 contributions to the CAP illustrate donor willingness to fund UNHCR's principal activities and some of its support for hosting areas, but little interest in funding other agencies' development-oriented projects for hosting areas. For example, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the European Union's aid agency, does not fund development projects for refugee hosting areas in Tanzania because it views such projects as beyond its mandate to assist refugees.⁶² Over time, donors' failure to sustain development commitments has contributed to a wasteful cycle of dependency, with donors spending about \$60 to 80 million each year for refugee assistance, nearly all for care and maintenance.⁶³ The refugees' lack of rights, particularly their inability to work and access to markets, have caused food insecurity and greater reliance on rations, requiring WFP to request nearly \$3 million more in funding to increase rations in 2005. Rather than invest in local development projects that would enable refugees to contribute to the economy, donors have perpetuated refugees' long-term dependent care.

Inadequate support for the UNDP, FAO, UNICEF, and WHO projects reflect donors' unwillingness to fund long-term development or to engage the participation of other UN agencies in what they see as refugee relief. In this regard, development assistance for refugee hosting areas is trapped in the gap between relief and development: it is neither viewed as emergency aid, which has the appeal of urgency, nor traditional development, which has the support of other constituencies. Among UN agencies, UNHCR has been the most committed to development aid for refugees and their hosts. But some have criticized UNHCR for stepping too far into the development arena occupied by UNDP, which is reluctant to devote significant resources to refugees.⁶⁴



"We want to go home ... but right now we can't find work and I have a family to feed," said a Congolese woman, eating with her family from a single bowl of corn meal mixed with water.

Photo: USCRI/G. Chen

Furthermore, despite talk of bringing together development and refugee aid, neither donors nor hosts generally perceive refugees themselves as important contributors to local development. As a result, neither emphasizes development projects that call for refugees' participation in trade, farming, or the labor market. If donors and hosts included refugees as economic actors in local development projects, they could increase the benefits refugees offer and mitigate their negative impacts.

The general failure to link development assistance and refugee aid has enabled Tanzania to argue that refugees burden the western region and that it cannot count on donors to share this responsibility. The refugees themselves are not responsible for the policies confining them to the region and the continued lack of economic development.⁶⁵ Unable to work, contribute to the economy, or leave in search of opportunities elsewhere, refugees have little choice but to depend on external aid. The Government must take responsibility for the results of its warehousing policy, which has lasted more than a decade.

Linking Refugee Aid to Refugee Rights

Refugee protection and assistance constitute a major portion of donor funding in Tanzania, and therefore donors can influence Tanzania's refugee policies.⁶⁶ To increase refugee protection and rights, donors should offer additional funding conditioned upon the Government reestablishing and maintaining a strong refugee protection regime. If donors do not insist that Tanzania grant rights, initiatives that introduce development assistance to refugee relief will not necessarily lead to refugees' greater exercise of rights.

A 2002 assessment commissioned by ECHO stated:

Linking relief and development, in the restrictive environment of the camp with profound limitations on self-reliance activities for refugees and the aid organisations, is not feasible. While it is recognised that this is the policy of [the Tanzanian Government], a policy which has not changed despite the attempted influence of WFP and other



organisations. It needs to be stressed that refugees as well as organisations may end up becoming totally dependent on the routine actions of handing out and receiving food.⁶⁷

Effective development cannot be accomplished unless the Government allows refugees to leave the camps so they can trade in local markets, find work in towns or villages, or farm land.

A recent development project illustrates the need to tie funding to policies granting refugee rights. An NGO constructed markets in the Kibondo region to promote economic development and trade between nationals and refugees in the area. Refugees, however, had no access to markets because of Government restrictions on their movement. Donors should condition future support for similar projects on Tanzania granting refugees the freedom to access markets and engage in other economic activities. Refugees do not need to be the primary beneficiaries of such projects, as long as refugees can exercise their rights. For example, it would make sense to locate the markets where they are most

beneficial to the region's economy. In fact, the NGO built one of the Kibondo markets close to the border area to increase market access for the villages in that area, even though the market was relatively far from the camps.

Another way donors could encourage refugee rights in Tanzania would be to make a standing commitment to reimburse Tanzania for costs directly related to the hosting of refugees, such as education and public assistance. Reimbursement could be conditioned on Tanzania granting refugees rights to participate in the economy. UNHCR could return to its primary protection mandate and verify that refugees are receiving these services and exercising their rights. This would address Tanzania's concerns about the lack of support for costs associated with hosting refugees. Such a method may not be feasible in short-term crises, but in protracted situations it makes more sense for Tanzania to develop its own schools, healthcare facilities, and other systems to provide services to refugees and locals than to rely on a foreign, parallel, camp-based aid system.

Recommendations

To the Tanzanian Government:

- Cease the *refoulement* and large-scale round-ups and deportation of asylum seekers and refugees which violate the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) and the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.
- Grant refugees the freedom to leave the camps, to work, trade, farm, own and operate businesses, and contribute to Tanzania's economy rather than live in a state of indefinite dependency.
- Initiate a public education and awareness campaign about the positive benefits that refugees bring to host communities, including their contributions to agricultural output and increased trade.
- Re-open all markets and allow trade between refugees and nationals.

To donor nations:

- Make a long-term commitment to provide additional aid to Tanzania if it grants refugees rights in accord with the 1951 Convention.
- Fund development projects in refugee hosting-areas

that foster greater refugee participation in farming, trade, business, and labor exchange.

- Make a long-term commitment to reimburse Tanzania, if it grants refugees access to the Tanzanian education system and health services, for the costs of those services.

To nongovernmental organizations:

- Educate Tanzanian government officials, business leaders, religious leaders, educators, and other civil society institutions about refugee rights and protection and the economic and social benefits that refugees could bring to Tanzania with such rights.

To the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees:

- Hold donor nations and the Tanzanian Government accountable to the 1951 Convention and other national and international laws that protect refugees and asylum seekers.
- Coordinate UN and donor initiatives that introduce development assistance into refugee hosting areas and that foster refugee participation in local economic activity.

Refugee Protection and the U.S. Millennium Challenge Account

The U.S. Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), first proposed by President Bush in 2002 and funded at \$2.5 billion, presents another opportunity to strengthen protection of refugee rights.⁶⁸ Unlike other forms of development assistance, the MCA determines eligibility based on publicly available, transparent, and prior implementation of economic growth and poverty reduction policies. Eligible countries can count on outright, most likely renewable grants of three to five years in duration rather than loans.

The MCA uses 16 indicators, several of which may take into account a country's treatment of refugees, to determine eligibility for funding. For example, the MCA specifically measures the extent to which a country's inhabitants enjoy basic "human and civil rights," "property rights," "worker rights," education, health care, and an open economic system.⁶⁹ While the MCA's ranking system does not focus on refugees in particular, it evaluates how each country treats its populace and will accordingly consider how a country treats refugees, especially if their numbers are great.⁷⁰ Countries that deny refugees health care, education, economic freedoms, or other basic rights might find their score lowered in those indicators. In 2004, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the MCA's implementing agency, reportedly denied eligibility to Bhutan at least in part because of its human rights violations that generated large refugee outflows.

In 2004, the MCC conducted its first eligibility determination, opening the field to those countries with annual per capita incomes falling below \$1,415 (in FY05, below \$1,465).⁷¹ It selected 16 eligible countries and invited them to submit proposals. The MCC did not deem Tanzania eligible, but selected it as one of 12 "threshold" countries. As a threshold country, Tanzania was given the opportunity to apply for seed money (from a pool of \$40 million to \$50 million) to improve its rankings and possibly later qualify as eligible. Tanzania received poor marks in the political rights, trade, primary education, and corruption indicators. To be competitive for the MCA, Tanzania must demonstrate its commitment to improve its areas of weakness while also maintaining its performance in the other indicators. Kenya, Zambia, and Uganda, each of which had refugee popula-

tions of over 200,000, also qualified as threshold countries.

Tanzania's violations of refugees' rights could reduce its chances of qualifying for the MCA. Across the board, the Government denies basic rights to more than 400,000 refugees, roughly one percent of its population. Tanzania's recent practice of *refoulement* and its deprivation of refugees' freedom of movement and the right to work are gross violations of international law. The denial of these rights not only harms refugees but impedes economic growth and development in the western region as a whole, which should lower its economic policy rankings. The MCC would not have known of and been able to take into account the fall 2004 *refoulement* incidents when it desig-



Refugees in camps assiduously recycle ration cans, plastic bags, and buckets to build homes and collect water. This Congolese boy holds a World Food Programme oil can, but in his arms it's a drum. Photo: USCRI/G. Chen

nated Tanzania as a threshold country in September 2004. But the MCC should consider these in future determinations.

Once the MCC chooses to fund a country, it need not fund programs that specifically address the needs of refugees. But by requiring continued adherence



to the indicators, the MCC creates incentives for countries to maintain a positive policy environment after entering into a compact. The MCC has not specified for how long it will sustain funding, but commentators speculate that it is likely to give two or three contracts, called “compacts,” to countries, resulting in support of up to 10 years or more.⁷²

As a general principle, donors aiming to link development assistance with refugee aid should require countries to honor refugee rights *before* granting funds. Already, the Danish Government’s aid agency, Danida, reports which countries receiving aid are parties to the international conventions protecting human rights, though it does not currently track compliance with the 1951 Convention.⁷³ Similarly, the U.S. Department of State annually reviews human rights practices and noted in 2005 that Tanzania had violated several human rights norms, including the *refoulement* of Burundians.⁷⁴

Donor countries should strengthen their application of human rights standards to ensure compliance with funding objectives. The country updates in this *Survey* evaluate refugee protection policy and practice based on rights in the 1951 Convention. As Tanzania scored poorly in several categories, donors should apply an evaluation system prospectively to encourage the Government to grant rights to refugees. Donors should commit to increase funding in refugee or development assistance as long as Tanzania adheres to the refugee protection policies prescribed by the funding agreement.

Hundreds of thousands of refugees have been waiting years to work, move about freely, and exercise basic rights. By keeping refugees in camps and dependent on aid, Tanzania has fallen short of its international responsibility to protect them. Nor is its refugee confinement policy the best option for nationals. Donors must also take responsibility for funding practices that have perpetuated refugees’ dependence on aid. Donors should fund Tanzania generously if it grants refugees their rights. Now is the time to exercise such leadership so that Tanzania can return to a refugee protection regime that honors the humanity of those who need its protection and shelter.

Endnotes

- ¹ Julius Nyerere, Arusha Conference 1979 quoted in UNHCR, “Report of the Conference on the Situation of Refugees in Africa, Tanzania, 7-17 May 1979,” REF/AR/CONF/Rpt.1, HCR/INF/48/Rev. 2 cited in Barry N. Stein, “ICARA II: Burden Sharing and Durable Solutions,” John R. Rogge, ed., *Refugees: A Third World Dilemma*, 1987, p. 57.
- ² Benjamin Mkapa, “Intervention by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, His Excellency Benjamin William Mkapa,” presented at the Symposium on the Great Lakes Region, Nile International Conference Centre, Kampala, Uganda, April 10, 2002, quoted in University of Dar es Sa-

laam, Center for the Study of Forced Migration, “The Impact of the Presence of Refugees in Northwestern Tanzania,” September 2003 (CSFM 2003), p. 4.

- ³ See CSFM 2003; Beth Whitaker, “Changing Opportunities: Refugees and Host Communities in Western Tanzania,” *New Issues in Refugee Research*, UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit (EPAU) Working Paper No. 11, 1999 (Whitaker 1999); Beth Whitaker, “Refugees in Western Tanzania: The Distribution of Burdens and Benefits Among Local Hosts,” *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2002, 339-358 (Whitaker 2002).
- ⁴ UNHCR, “Tanzania Set to Close One of Its Nine Camps for Burundian Refugees,” UNHCR Briefing Notes, April 5, 2005.
- ⁵ *Xinhua General News Services*, “All Congolese refugees to leave Tanzania for home in 2005,” January 21, 2005.
- ⁶ Warehousing refers to the deprivation of refugees’ rights set forth in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and other international law, particularly the right to work and freedom of movement. See Merrill Smith, “Warehousing Refugees: A Denial of Rights, a Waste of Humanity,” in *World Refugee Survey 2004—Warehousing Issue*, pp. 38-56.
- ⁷ UNHCR and WFP, “Joint UNWFP/UNHCR Assessment Mission (JAM) 2004, October 18-31, 2004,” Final Report, January 2005 (JAM 2004), p. 9.
- ⁸ UNHCR and WFP, “Refugee Food Shortages - DPG Impact of Ration Cuts,” Internal Memorandum, February 23, 2005.
- ⁹ See Greg Collins, “The Coping Strategies Index (CSI) Baseline Survey: World Food Programme (WFP) Assisted Refugees in Western Tanzania,” June-July 2004, unpublished manuscript (Collins 2004), http://www.refugees.org/data/warehousing/tanzania/docs/csi_wfp_tanzania.pdf.
- ¹⁰ Interview with UNHCR Protection Officer, Kigoma, Tanzania, August 2004.
- ¹¹ CSFM 2003, p. 16.
- ¹² Collins 2004, p. v.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 15.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 19.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 18.
- ¹⁷ Jeff Crisp, “Lessons Learned from the Implementation of the Security Package in Tanzania,” UNHCR EPAU, May 2001 (Crisp 2001).
- ¹⁸ Whitaker 1999, pp. 10-12.
- ¹⁹ Whitaker 2002, p. 355.
- ²⁰ Wim Klaasen and Aart van der Heide, Quest Consult, “Final, Synthesis Report, ECHO-funded WFP programme in Afghanistan, Eritrea, Tanzania, and Serbia, August 1-12 and 18-32, October 1-21, 2002,” (Klaasen and van der Heide 2002a), p.19, http://europa.eu.int/comm/echo/pdf_files/evaluation/2002/wfp_synthesis.pdf.
- ²¹ UNOCHA, “Tanzania 2004, Consolidated Appeals Process,” November 2003 (CAP Tanzania 2004), p. 16.
- ²² WFP and UNHCR, “Tanzania Refugee Operation, Joint Assessment Mission 2003, Final Report,” p. 5, http://www.unic.undp.org/special_page.htm.
- ²³ UNHCR and WFP, “Refugee Food Shortages,” 2005; UNHCR, “Tanzania: UNHCR Expresses appreciation of WFP food ration increase, despite inadequate donor funding,” UNHCR Briefing Notes, March 11, 2005; Klaasen and van der Heide 2002a, p. 22.
- ²⁴ Collins 2004, p. 6.
- ²⁵ Interviews with RSI members, August 2004.

- ²⁶ Roos Willems, "Kupata Riziki' or Making Ends Meet in Urban Tanzania," paper presented at the International Association for the Study of Forced Migration, Biennial Conference, Sao Paolo, January 2005 (Willems 2005), p. 6.
- ²⁷ Michela Macchiavello, "Forced migrants as an under-utilized asset: refugee skills, livelihoods, and achievements in Kampala, Uganda," New Issues in Refugee Research, UNHCR EPAU Working Paper No. 95 October 2003 (Macchiavello 2003), p. 5.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, citing A. Jablenksi, A.J. Marsella, et al., editors 'Stress research report No. 229', National Institute for Psychological Factors and Health Department of Stress Research, WHO Psychological Centre, Hotel Anglais, Stockholm, Sweden, 6-11 October 1991, p. 3.
- ²⁹ Willems 2005, pp. 7-9.
- ³⁰ Sergio Vieira-de-Mello, "UNHCR Policy on Refugees in Urban Areas, Inter-Office Memorandum No. 90/97, Field Office Memorandum No. 95/97," December 12, 1997, Appendix A to Naoko Obi and Jeff Crisp, "Evaluation of UNHCR's policy on refugees in urban areas: A case study review of New Delhi," November 2000, p. 31.
- ³¹ UNHCR, "Global Report 2000," June 2001; UNHCR, "Global Report 2002," June 2003; UNHCR, "Global Report 2003," June 2004.
- ³² Willems 2005, p. 15.
- ³³ Binaifer Nowrojee, "In the Name of Security: Erosion of Refugee Rights in East Africa," in Bill Frelick, ed., *World Refugee Survey 2000*, 2000 (Nowrojee 2000), pp. 48-53.
- ³⁴ See Beth Whitaker, "Changing Priorities in Refugee Protection: The Rwandan Repatriation from Tanzania," in Gil Loescher, Mark Gibney, and Niklaus Steiner, eds., *Problems of Protection: UNHCR and the Protection of Refugees and Human Rights*, 2003, p. 151. Whitaker notes that UNHCR's failure to protest the treatment of Rwandan refugees in the mid-1990s resulted in later weakening of refugee rights. See also Nowrojee 2000.
- ³⁵ Uhuru, "We are tired of refugees," December 20, 2004, printed in *BBC Monitoring Africa*, "Tanzanian paper says country "fed up" with Burundi refugees," December 20, 2004.
- ³⁶ CSFM 2003, p. 4.
- ³⁷ *Mtanzania*, February 26, 2000 (reporting comments by the Ngara District Commissioner); *Majira*, November 9, 1999 (reporting comments by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete) in CSFM 2003, pp. 5-7.
- ³⁸ CSFM 2003, p. 9.
- ³⁹ Whitaker 1999, p. 5.
- ⁴⁰ UNHCR and WFP, "Joint UNWFP/UNHCR Assessment Mission (JAM) 2004), October 18-31, 2004," Final Report, January 2005, p. 50.
- ⁴¹ CSFM 2003, pp. 17-21; Whitaker 1999, p. 5.
- ⁴² Whitaker 1999, p. 6.
- ⁴³ CSFM 2003, pp. 13-15.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 49.
- ⁴⁵ Interviews with refugees at Lugufu camp, August 2004.
- ⁴⁶ CAP Tanzania 2004, p. 12.
- ⁴⁷ Interview with Bonaventure Rutinwa, August 2004.
- ⁴⁸ CAP Tanzania 2004.
- ⁴⁹ See Tom Kuhlman, *Burden or Boon? A Study of Eritrean Refugees in the Sudan*, 1990; Barbara Harrell-Bond, *Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees*, 1986.
- ⁵⁰ CAP Tanzania 2004, p. 45.
- ⁵¹ Whitaker 2002, p. 355.
- ⁵² CAP Tanzania 2004, p. 23; Gorman ed., *Refugee Aid and Development Theory and Practice*, 1993 (Gorman 1993), p. 73; Beth Whitaker, "Creating Alternatives: Refugee Relief and Local Development in Western Tanzania," (Whitaker 2001), in Ondine Barrow and Mike Jennings, eds. *The Charitable Impulse: Relief, Development and Non-Governmental Organisations in North East Africa*, 2001, pp. 53-54.
- ⁵³ Gorman 1993, p. 64.
- ⁵⁴ Alexander Betts, "International cooperation and the targeting of development assistance for refugee solutions: Lessons from the 1980s," New Issues in Refugee Research, UNHCR EPAU Working Paper No. 107, September 2004 (Betts 2004), p. 12.
- ⁵⁵ Betts 2004 citing Gil Loescher, *The UNHCR and World Politics*, 2001, p. 2.
- ⁵⁶ Whitaker 2001, p. 54.
- ⁵⁷ JAM 2004, p. 52.
- ⁵⁸ Rutinwa 1996, p. 298. Donors had been trying to appease Tanzania, which had been threatening to close its borders. The mass influxes further exacerbated already growing antagonism toward refugees and resulted in the Government's expulsion of 500,000 refugees in late 1996.
- ⁵⁹ UNHCR 2002 Mid-year Report; Global Report 2000.
- ⁶⁰ CAP Tanzania 2004 Table III: List of Projects (grouped by sector) as of February 13, 2005, <http://www.reliefweb.int/fts>.
- ⁶¹ CAP Tanzania 2004, p. 7.
- ⁶² Email correspondence with ECHO staff, April 2005.
- ⁶³ UNHCR Global Appeals 2000-2005; UNHCR Global Reports 1999-2003; UNHCR, "Update on Developments in the Great Lakes Region (EC/47/SC/CRP.38), May 1997; UNHCR, "Update on Developments in the Great Lakes Region of Africa (EC/48/SC/CRP.25), 1998; UNHCR, "Standing Committee Update on Regional Developments in Africa," EC/46/SC/CRP.35, May 1, 1996.
- ⁶⁴ Whitaker 2002, pp 352-53.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁶ Nearly one third of Danida funding for Tanzania goes to UNHCR. Danida, Annual Report 2002, www.um.dk/Publikationer/Danida/English/DanishDevelopmentCooperation/AnnualReport2002/index.asp.
- ⁶⁷ Wim Klaasen and Aart van der Heide, Quest Consult, "Final Report, ECHO-funded WFP Programme in Tanzania, October 4-12, 2002," (Klaasen and van der Heide 2002b), p. 6. http://europa.eu.int/comm/echo/pdf_files/evaluation/2002/wfp_tanzania_exec_sum.pdf.
- ⁶⁸ See Millennium Challenge Account website: http://www.mca.gov/about_us/overview/index.shtml
- ⁶⁹ See Millennium Challenge Account website: www.mcc.gov. Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2004: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties*, 2004.
- ⁷⁰ See 22 U.S.C. § 7706 (b).
- ⁷¹ Millennium Challenge Corporation, "Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the Eligibility of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account Assistance in FY 2004," www.mcc.gov.
- ⁷² See Steve Radelet, *Challenging Foreign Aid: A Policymaker's Guide to the Millennium Challenge Account*, 2003.
- ⁷³ Danida, Annual Report 2002.
- ⁷⁴ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor "Tanzania - Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2004," February 28, 2005, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41630.htm>.